For some time we have been developing, and have had significant practical success with, a time-sensitive, contradiction-tolerant logical reasoning engine called the active logic machine (ALMA). The current paper details a semantics for a version of the underlying logical formalism, active logic. Central to active logic are special rules controlling the inheritance of beliefs in general (and of beliefs about the current time in particular), very tight controls on what can be derived from direct contradictions (P &¬P ), and mechanisms allowing an agent to represent and reason about its own beliefs and past reasoning. Furthermore, inspired by the notion that until an agent notices that a set of beliefs is contradictory, that set seems consistent (and the agent therefore reasons with it as if it were consistent), we introduce an "apperception function" that represents an agent's limited awareness of its own beliefs, and serves to modify inconsistent belief sets so as to yield consistent sets. Using these ideas, we introduce a new definition of logical consequence in the context of active logic, as well as a new definition of soundness such that, when reasoning with consistent premises, all classically sound rules remain sound in our new sense. However, not everything that is classically sound remains sound in our sense, for by classical definitions, all rules with contradictory premises are vacuously sound, whereas in active logic not everything follows from a contradiction.
Introduction
Real agents have some important characteristics that we need to take into account when thinking about how they might actually reason logically: (a) their reasoning takes time, meaning that agents always have only a limited, evolving awareness of the consequences of their own beliefs 1 , and (b) their knowledge is imperfect, meaning that some of their beliefs will need to be modified or retracted, and they will inevitably face direct contradictions and other inconsistencies. Indeed, real agents will not only often find their beliefs contradicted by experience, but will sometimes find that their beliefs have been internally inconsistent for some time, although they are only now in a position to notice this inconsistency, having derived a certain set of consequences that makes it apparent. The challenge from the standpoint of classical logical formalisms is that, if an agent's knowledge base can be inconsistent, then according to classical logic, it is permissible to derive any formula from it.
This fact about classical logics is commonly known by the Latin phrase ex contradictione quodlibet: from a contradiction everything follows. However, Graham Priest has coined the somewhat more vivid term explosive logics: a logic is explosive iff for all formulas A and B, (A&¬A) |= B. Priest defines a paraconsistent logic precisely as one which is not explosive [41, 42, 43] . Now, clearly real agents cannot tolerate the promiscuity of belief resulting from explosive logics, and must somehow maintain control over their reasoning, watching for and dealing with contradictions as they arise. The reasoning of real agents, that is, must be paraconsistent. But what sort of paraconsistent logic might agents usefully employ, what methods might agents use to control inference and deal with contradictions, and how can these logics (and methods) be modeled in terms of truth and consequence in structures?
In the current paper we are primarily interested in the last of these questions. For some time we have been developing, and have had significant practical success with, a time-sensitive, contradiction-tolerant logical reasoning engine called the active logic machine (ALMA) [47] . Because ALMA was designed with the above challenges in mind, its underlying formalism, active logic [18, 34, 35] , includes special rules controlling the inheritance of beliefs in general (and of beliefs about the current time in particular), very tight controls on what can be derived from direct contradictions (P &¬P ), and mechanisms allowing an agent to represent and reason about its own beliefs and past reasoning.
Here we offer a semantics for a version of active logic. We hope and expect it will be of interest as a specific model of formal reasoning for real-world agents that have to face both the relentlessness of time, and the inevitability of contradictions.
In the next sections (2 -6) we will introduce the formal semantics for active logic, discuss a new definition of the consequence relation, and give examples of sound and unsound active logic inferences. This will be followed by some more informal discussion of the various properties of active logic (section 7), a comparison of active logic with related approaches (section 8), and a discussion of the practical issues involved with the use of active logic in real-world agents (sections 9 and 10).
A semantics for real-world reasoning
In this section we propose a semantics for a time-sensitive, contradiction-tolerant reasoning formalism, incorporating the basic features of active logic.
Starting assumptions
In order to make the problem tractable for our first specification of the semantics, we will work under the following assumptions concerning the agent, the world (i.e., everything apart from the agent), and their interactions:
• There is only one agent a.
• The agent starts its life at time t = 0 (t ∈ N ) and runs indefinitely.
• The world is stationary for t ≥ 0. Thus, changes occur only in the beliefs of the agent a.
Given these assumptions, there is one and only one true complete theory of the world; however, given that the agent's beliefs evolve over time, there is a different true complete theory of the agent for each time t.
The language L
In order to express theories about such an agent-and-world, we define a sorted first-order language L. We define it in two parts: the language L w , a propositional language in which will be expressed facts about the world, and the language L a , a first-order language used to express facts about the agent, including the agent's beliefs, for instance that the agent's time is now t, that the agent believes P , or that the agent discovered a contradiction in its beliefs at a given time. We write Sn K to mean the set of sentences of any language K. We are using the complete set of connectives {¬, →} from which other connectives, such as ∧, and ∨, can be derived.
Definition 1 Let L w be a propositional language consisting of the following symbols:
• a set S of sentence symbols (propositional or sentential variables) S = {S j i : i, j ∈ N } (N is the set of natural numbers). The subscripts are used to indicate different propositional sentences and, fixing the subscript, the superscripts are used to indicate different apperceptions (see section 4) of the agent of the same proposition. The superscript 0 is used for the original sentence symbol (without superscripts).
• the propositional connectives ¬ and →
• left and right parentheses ( and )
Sn Lw is the set of sentences of L w formed in the usual way.
Definition 2 Let σ, θ ∈ Sn Lw . We say that {σ, θ} is a direct contradiction if one of the following holds: either θ = ¬σ or σ = ¬θ Before giving the definition of the language L a , we remark the following:
i. In its current version L a is a restricted form of first-order logic that is essentially propositional. In future work we intend to extend it to the full power of first-order logic.
ii. L a contains a belief predicate that captures the fact that the agent believed a certain proposition at some time t. We allow for sentences of the form: at time s the agent believed that she believed that she · · · . To allow for this indefinite (however finite) nesting, the definition of L a has to be inductive where at stage n + 1 all sentences from the previous levels are captured for the belief predicate.
Definition 3
The language L a is a sorted restricted version of first-order logic having three sorts:
• S 1 is used to represent Sn Lw .
• S 2 is used to represent time.
• S 3 is used to represent Sn L at its various stages of construction as shown below.
L a will be defined as the union of a sequence of languages {L n } n∈N which are defined as follows:
• n = 0 : L 0 is a restricted first-order sorted language that does not contain variables or quantifiers, and consists of the following symbols:
-the propositional connective ¬ -the constant symbol 0 of sort S 2 (this represents the time instance t = 0)
-a set of constant symbols D = {σ : σ ∈ Sn Lw }, each is of sort S 1 (here for simplicity, the constant symbols used to represent Sn Lw are the sentences themselves)
-a set of constant symbols E 0 = {θ : θ ∈ Sn Lw }, each is of sort S 3 (again for simplicity the sentences themselves are used as constant symbols)
-the unary predicate symbol N ow of sort S 2 -the binary predicate symbol Contra of sort (S 1 × S 2 )
• n = 1 : L 1 is a restricted first-order sorted language that does not contain variables or quantifiers. In addition to the symbols of L 0 , it contains the constant symbol 1 of sort S 2 (representing the time instance t = 1), a set of constant symbols E 1 = {θ : θ ∈ Sn L0 } of sort S 3 , and a binary predicate symbol Bel of sort (S 3 × S 2 ).
• n > 1 : Assume that L m has already been defined for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n. L n+1 is a restricted first-order sorted language that does not contain variables or quantifiers. In addition to the symbols of L n , it contains the constant symbol n + 1 of sort S 2 and a set of constant symbols E n+1 = {θ : θ ∈ Sn Ln } of sort S 3 .
Let C = {i : i ∈ N }, to collect the constant symbols that represent the time indices. Let E = i∈N E i . Let the language L a = n∈N L n so Sn La = n∈N Sn Ln . C, D, E are sets of constant symbols and hence terms in the language L a .
In L a , N ow is used to express the agent's time, the symbol Contra is used to indicate the existence of a direct contradiction in its beliefs, and the symbol Bel expresses the fact that the agent had a particular belief at a given time. The sort S 2 stands for time. The semantics for these predicates will be defined formally in Definition 8.
Definition 5 Let the agent's knowledge base at time t, KB t , be a finite set of sentences from L, that is, KB t ⊆ Sn L . In the case of KB 0 we allow only formulas of Sn Lw whose superscripts are all 0.
Intuitively, the sentences about the world all have superscript 0 for the sentence symbols; however, as we will see later, the agent may assign different superscripts to the sentences thereby changing a possibly inconsistent set to one that is consistent.
The semantics of L w
In the following several definitions, we define the semantics of the formalism given above, in the standard way.
Definition 6 An L w -truth assignment is a function h : S → {T, F } defined over the set S of sentence symbols in L w .
Definition 7 An L w interpretation h (we keep the same notation for this induced interpretation) is a function h : Sn Lw → {T, F } over Sn Lw that extends an L w -truth assignment h as follows:
We also stipulate a standard definition of consistency for L w : a set of L w sentences is consistent iff there is some interpretation h in which all the sentences are true. Notationally we write the usual h |= Σ, to mean all the sentences of Σ are assigned T by h.
We'll call W t the set of all L-expressible facts about the external world. Thus, W t is consistent at every time t. This means that for every t there exists an L w -truth assignment function h t , such that h t |= W t . We'll also call the induced interpretation h t , keeping the same notation. This result does not depend upon the assumption that the world is stationary. In a stationary world a single h t will work for all t; in a changing world there may be a different h t , but there will still be some h t , for each t. For a brief discussion of how we intend to approach the issue of a changing world in future work, see section 11.
This does not mean that the agent's beliefs about the world are all true and consistent, only that there is some set of true and consistent sentences that describe the world for every t. We'll detail later how to interpret and model the agent's world-knowledge (this being the crux of the issue when dealing with inconsistency). First, however, we turn to a model of the agent's metaknowledge.
A model of the agent's L a beliefs
First of all it is important to note that, even in the case where the agent's beliefs are incomplete, incorrect, or inconsistent, there is always a complete and consistent theory of those beliefs at the meta level, and this theory can be expressed using the language L a . For instance, if the agent believes both S i and ¬S i , the two sentences "the agent believes S i " and "the agent believes ¬S i " can both be true at the same time.
Now we define an interpretation that models the theory about the agent at the meta level. Σ is assumed to be the agent's knowledge base, combining beliefs about the world and about the agent, at some time t. Our point of view is that at any time t the agent may deduce new beliefs from its knowledge base at time t − 1, may add new sentences, for example from observations, or delete some sentences. We assume that all time values included in sentences of Σ are ≤ t − 1, except as an argument for N ow where the values are ≤ t. This means that the agent reasons only about the past except for the present N ow. We define the interpretation H Σ t+1 (at time t + 1 based on Σ) modeling facts about the agent as follows.
Definition 8 H
Σ t+1 is defined as the following interpretation:
= Sn L (the set of sentences representing the agents's knowledge base)
The predicate symbol N ow has the following semantics: H Σ t+1 |= N ow(s) ⇐⇒ s = t + 1 and N ow(t) ∈ Σ. N ow keeps track of the time, and indicates the current time of the agent's internal clock.
• The predicate symbol Contra has the following semantics: H Σ t+1 |= Contra(σ, s) ⇐⇒ either s < t and Contra(σ, s) ∈ Σ or s = t and ∃σ, ¬σ ∈ Σ. Contra indicates that the existence of a direct contradiction in Σ at some time s < t.
• The predicate symbol Bel has the following semantics: H Σ t+1 |= Bel(θ, s) ⇐⇒ either s < t and Bel(θ, s) ∈ Σ or s = t and θ ∈ Σ. Bel has the rough meaning "believes that", and states that a given sentence from L was in the agent's KB at some time s < t.
A model of the agent's L w beliefs
Now we turn to the challenging problem of how to model, at the object level, the agent's beliefs about the world, given that these beliefs are not just evolving from moment to moment, but that at any given time, they may be inconsistent. Our scenario is as follows. At time 0 the agent has a finite set of initial beliefs, KB 0 , about the world. All the sentence symbols have superscript 0. Then the agent starts to reason about the world using rules of active logic. This is where the agent may assign, via its apperception function, nonzero superscripts to some sentence symbols to avoid inconsistency. The agent may also obtain additional information about the world over time through other means, such as observations.
We will tackle this problem initially in three steps. First, we define a weak notion of consistency allowing for inconsistency in the agent's knowledge about the world; second, we will define a class of "apperception functions" intended to capture the intuition that an inconsistent KB will not necessarily seem inconsistent to the agent; and finally, we will show that there is some apperception function that, when applied to a given set of sentences, always produces a consistent set. Having shown this, we will proceed in the following sections to define a viable notion of active consequence, discuss the relation of this notion of consequence to the classical notion of logical consequence, and prove the soundness of some of the central inference rules of active logic.
Recalling that Σ need not be consistent concerning facts about the world we define a weak version of consistency.
Definition 9 A set of sentences Σ ⊆ Sn L is said to be L a consistent iff Σ∩Sn La is consistent.
Remark 1 From now on, we will assume that Σ, is L a consistent. We also introduce the term Γ to refer to the potentially inconsistent set of L w sentences in Σ: Γ = Σ ∩ Sn Lw .
We next define an apperception (self-awareness) function for the agent. The notion of an apperception function is intended to help capture, at least roughly, how the world might seem to an agent with a given belief set Σ. For a real agent, only some logical consequences are believed at any given time, since it cannot manage to infer all the potentially infinitely many consequences in a finite time, let alone in the present moment. Moreover, even if the agent has contradictory beliefs, the agent still has a view of the world, and there will be limits on what the agent will and won't infer. This is in sharp distinction to the classical notion of a model, where (i) inconsistent beliefs are ruled out of bounds, since then there are no models, and (ii) all logical consequences of the KB are true in all models.
The task we are addressing, then, is that of finding a notion of semantics that avoids both (i) and (ii) above. Our idea-via apperception functions-is to suppose that an agent's limited resources apply also to its ability to inspect its own knowledge. Thus, if S 0 i and ¬S 0 i are both in Σ, the agent might not realize, at first, that the two instances of S i are in fact instances of the same sentence symbol. Thus it might seem to the agent that the world is one in which, say, S 1 i is true, and so is ¬S 2 i . This allows the agent to have inconsistent beliefs while still having a consistent world model. Moreover, it allows us to see how an agent with inconsistent beliefs could avoid vacuously concluding any proposition, and also reason in a directed way, by applying inference rules only to an appropriately apperceived subset of its beliefs. We hope that this approach can shed some light on focused, step-wise, resource-bounded reasoning more generally.
An example of issue (ii), above, although one currently beyond what our investigation can represent, is that of Andrew Wiles working on a proof of Fermat's Last Theorem (FLT). He did not know, until he had completed his proof, that FLT was true. Yet he did have among his beliefs sufficient axioms to guarantee FLT as a consequence. So how did the world seem to him? Along the lines we are suggesting, he viewed some sentences as having possible interpretations different from what he later discovered to be the case. In effect, apperception functions, collectively, allow for a blurring of the identities, and hence meanings, of symbols.
The apperception functions we define can make changes only to Γ. An apperception function does not change Σ − Γ. We use the same notation ap when the apperception function is applied to a sentence symbol, a sentence, or a set of sentences. We start by defining a function that changes the superscripts of sentence symbols to 0. This is used to recover the original direct contradictions that were modified by the assignment of superscripts.
Definition 10 For any sentence φ ∈ Sn Lw , let z(φ) be the sentence φ with all superscripts reset to 0. If Σ ⊆ Sn Lw , then z(Σ) = {z(φ)|φ ∈ Σ}.
Definition 11 An apperception (awareness) ap is a function ap : Σ → Σ where Σ is a set of L-sentences.
The effect of ap on Σ is as follows:
1. Let φ ∈ Γ. Then ap(φ) is obtained from φ by changing the superscripts of zero or more of the sentence symbols that appear in φ. Let ap(Γ) = {ap(φ)|φ ∈ Γ}.
The following is a valid application of an apperception function to Σ:
In our presentation there are infinitely many ways of assigning superscripts to sentence symbols, yielding infinitely many apperception functions. We need to do this in general because a finite set of sentences in L w may have an arbitrarily large (finite) number of sentence symbols. However, if Σ is known to contain n occurrences of sentence symbols, then it suffices to deal only with apperception functions that add at most n new superscripts, one for each sentence symbol.
We sketch here a formal presentation. Define an equivalence relation on apperception functions relative to Σ as follows: Apperception functions ap 1 and ap 2 are Σ -equivalent if there is a bijection f : N → N such that f (0) = 0 (the superscript 0 has a special meaning) and such that for each sentence symbol
. We can then work with the set of equivalence classes of apperception functions, and that is finite for any (finite) Σ. To avoid further complications in the presentation, we will continue to use just apperception functions with the realization that only finitely many are really needed.
The purpose of the apperception functions is to get rid of inconsistencies in Σ. Hence we are interested only in apperception functions that output consistent sets. The set of apperception functions that do this depends on Σ.
Definition 12 Let AP denote the class of all apperception functions. AP Σ = {ap ∈ AP |ap(Σ) is consistent }.
Next we show that AP
Σ is never empty.
Proof Let ap assign a unique superscript to each sentence symbol in Γ. Then every sentence symbol appearing in ap(Γ) is unique, hence each can be assigned a truth value independently. So ap(Γ) is consistent. Since the remaining sentences in Σ are consistent by assumption, and are in L a , ap ∈ AP Σ .
Active consequence

The definition of active consequence
At this point we are ready to define the notion of active consequence at time t-the active logic equivalent of logical consequence. We start by defining the concept of 1-step active consequence as a relationship between sets of sentences Σ and Θ of L, where Σ = KB t and Θ is a potential subset of KB t+1 . When we define this notion we want to make sure that Θ contains only sentences required by Σ and the definition of H Σ t+1 . This is the reason for the next definition.
Definition 13 Given Σ and ap ∈ AP Σ , define
. So we are removing direct contradictions from ap(Γ) while ignoring the superscripts.
Then Θ is said to be a 1-step active consequence of Σ at time t, written Σ |= 1 Θ if and only if ∃ap ∈ AP Σ such that
In this definition, for the sentences of Θ in the agent's language (at the meta level) 1-step active consequence depends on the interpretation H t+1 . Instead of Γ, we include z(Γ) to capture all direct contradictions even if the superscripts have been changed. This also means that the Bel and Contra statements will contain sentence symbols only with superscript 0. For all the sentences of Θ expressing facts about the world, there must be some apperception function such that the apperception of Σ (the L w part) minus the direct contradictions classically implies these sentences. In the following we define the more general case of n-active consequence for any positive integer n (similarly, as a result of this definition Θ is a potential part of KB t+n ).
Definition 15
i Let Σ, Θ ⊆ Sn L such that Σ = KB t . Then Θ is said to be an n-step active consequence of Σ at time t, written Σ |= n Θ, if and only if
ii We say that Θ is an active consequence of Σ, written Σ |= a Θ, if and only if Σ |= n Θ for some positive integer n.
Next we give some examples to illustrate the concept of active consequence. In each case we assume that Σ = KB t .
Example 3
i. Let Σ = {S Note that in Example 3.v, it is not the case that Σ |= 1 {Contra(S 0 1 , t)} even though the conditions for the later appearance of the relevant direct contradiction were already in place at time t. This underlines the fact that in active logic it can take time for consequences to appear in the KB. In the case of L a sentences, this temporal aspect of the logic is regulated and enforced directly by the semantics. For L w sentences, it is an artifact of the particular set of rules that a given active logic agent is equipped with (see Sections 9 and 10 for more discussion of this issue).
Thus, for instance, considering the types of rules in active logic, given a rule like :
t:α,α→ϕ,ϕ→ψ t+1: ψ an agent could infer ψ in one step from the formulas given at time t; however an agent equipped only with a simple version of modus ponens, such as that given in Definition 22 (see Section 6.1) would take two time steps to conclude ψ from the same formulas. Both rules would be sound in active logic (see Definition 16) , but a given agent might not be equipped with both rules (see Section 10) . Since our definition of 1-step active consequence for sentences in L w is based on logical implication, it is at least as powerful any set of sound syntactical rules could be.
The relationship between active consequence and 1-step active consequence
By our definition of active consequence, Σ |= 1 Θ implies Σ |= a Θ. We may wonder how much bigger Θ may be in the latter case. Consider first a very simple
Here we have Σ |= 1 Θ and Θ |= 1 Θ , hence Σ |= 2 Θ . This illustrates that considering L a there will be additional sentences for each n-step active consequence for each new value of n. We show that this not does not happen for sentences of L w .
Proof In this proof we deal only with L w sentences. The ⇒ part follows from the definition of |= a .
Going in the other direction we show that Σ |= 2 Θ ⇒ Σ |= 1 Θ . So assume that Σ |= 2 Θ , that is, for some Θ, Σ |= 1 Θ and Θ |= 1 Θ . There are two cases to consider: Σ is consistent or Σ is inconsistent.
If Σ is consistent then Θ is any set of sentences logically implied by Σ except that we may change sentence symbol superscripts through an apperception function. Since logical implication is transitive, that is, Σ |= Θ and Θ |= Θ implies Σ |= Θ , this means that already Σ |= 1 Θ . Hence the second step adds nothing new that could not be obtained by 1-step active consequence.
If Σ is not consistent, then for any apperception function applied to it, ap ∈ AP Σ , ap z (Γ) removes direct contradictions and must make ap(Σ) consistent, so Θ is consistent. At this point, just as in the first case, for Θ |= 1 Θ , nothing new could be added, so Σ |= 1 Θ .
In both cases we find that Σ |= 2 Θ implies Σ |= 1 Θ . At this point, as shown in the consistent case additional steps add nothing new. Hence the result follows.
Although we proved this result only for sentences in L w , the same proof works (restricted to sentences of L w ) even if Σ and Θ contain sentences in L a .
The relationship between classical logical consequence and active consequence
How does classical logical consequence compare to active logic consequence? For sentences in Sn La the two are incomparable. For consider Σ = {N ow(t)}. Clearly, Σ |= Σ, but Σ |= a Σ because N ow(t) will not be true at any time after t. Next consider Θ = {Bel(N ow(t), t)}. Then Σ |= Θ but Σ |= a Θ. So for the comparison we restrict our attention to Sn Lw . In classical logic an inconsistent set of sentences logically implies every sentence, but that is not the case for active consequence. The interesting question is what happens if Σ ⊆ Sn Lw is consistent. It seems reasonable to expect active consequence to behave just like logical consequence. Recalling our theorem from the previous subsection, it suffices to compare only |= and |= 1 because in this case |= 1 and |= a give the same result.
So in the consistent case we might expect Σ |= Θ ⇔ Σ |= a Θ. The first implication, Σ |= Θ ⇒ Σ |= a Θ, holds because we can choose the apperception function to be the identity function. Intuitively the opposite implication should hold as well. For consider that every given set of consistent sentences has a certain definite set of conclusions (consequences)-call this the "inferential power " of the set. We would expect this same set in active logic to have no more inferential power than it has under classical logical consequence. For consider an apperception function that assigns a different number to every sentence symbol in Σ = {S Proof Under the hypotheses of this theorem all superscripts of sentences must be 0. Hence the apperception function must be the identity function, so 1-step active consequence is identical to logical consequence, that is, Σ |= Θ ⇔ Σ |= 1 Θ. The result follows from Theorem 2.
We see that 1-step active consequence is very powerful for consistent sets of sentences. It encompasses any set of active logic rules for Sn Lw . In that sense it is the limiting case for all possible sets of such active logic rules and provides an approximation to a completeness result. In the following, we write for derivability in active logic, instead of the vertical notation commonly used there. See the next section for the standard vertical notation. 
Sound and unsound inferences in active logic
At this point we consider possible inference rules for active logic. We start by defining the notion of a-sound inference.
Definition 16
An active sound (a-sound) inference, is one in which the consequent is a 1-step active consequence of the antecedent.
Recall that (1-step) active consequence is defined between sets of sentences. But below we will omit the set notation symbols { and } . Also, in active logic there are no superscripts for sentence symbols corresponding to the case in our version where all superscripts are 0.
Some active-sound inference rules
For all six rules given here, a-soundness follows directly from the definitions. We prove the last as an illustration.
Definition 17
If N ow(t) ∈ KB t then the timing inference rule is defined as follows:
t : N ow(t) t + 1 : N ow(t + 1) Definition 18 If ϕ, ¬ϕ ∈ KB t , where ϕ ∈ Sn Lw , then the direct contradiction inference rule is defined as follows:
t : ϕ, ¬ϕ t + 1 : Contra(ϕ, t) Definition 19 If ϕ ∈ KB t , where ϕ ∈ Sn L , then the positive introspection inference rule is defined as follows:
Definition 20 If ϕ ∈ KB t , where ϕ ∈ Sn L , then the negative introspection inference rule is defined as follows:
If ϕ ∈ Sn L such that ϕ ∈ KB t , ¬ϕ ∈ KB t , ϕ = N ow(t), and ϕ is not a contradiction, then the inheritance inference rule is defined as follows:
t : ϕ t + 1 : ϕ Definition 22 Let Σ = {ϕ, ϕ → ψ} ⊆ (KB t ∩ Sn Lw ) such that Σ is consistent. Assume ¬ϕ ∈ KB t and ¬(ϕ → ψ) ∈ KB t (see Section 6.3 for more on this restriction), then the active modus ponens inference rule is defined as follows:
The rules given in Definitions 17 -22 are a-sound.
For Definitions 17 -21, their a-soundness follows from the definitions. By way of illustration, consider the following for active modus ponens (Definition 22):
Proof Use an apperception function which is the identity on Σ and assigns a unique different superscript to any other symbol in KB t .
Active-unsound inference rules
We examine a number of instances of classically unsound inference rules, and get the expected intuitive results that these inferences are also active-unsound. In all cases ϕ and ψ are arbitrary sentences of L.
Definition 23
We call this first rule the ϕ implies ψ, or ϕ → ψ rule.
t : ϕ t + 1 : ψ Theorem 6 The ϕ → ψ inference rule is not a-sound (is a-unsound).
Proof Let ϕ = S ). Then ψ is not an active consequence of ϕ, because by Theorem 3, this would mean that ψ classically follows from ϕ, and that is false.
Definition 24
We call this next rule the ϕ implies not ϕ, or ϕ-not-ϕ rule: We assume that ϕ is a consistent formula. Interestingly, although the ϕ-not-ϕ inference rule is a-unsound in general (with respect to the big language L), there is one special instance in which it is sound, namely:
This further underlines the special status of time and the N ow() predicate in active logic; this result would obviously not be classically sound.
However, one rule that is classically sound, but a-unsound, is the explosive rule. This shows that active logic is a paraconsistent logic, something we consider one of its advantages over classical formalisms.
Definition 25 Let Σ ⊆ Sn Lw be inconsistent. Let ψ ∈ Sn Lw . We define the explosive rule with respect to the language L w as follows. 
Inconsistent KBs, apperception functions and the application of a-sound rules
We noted above that there can be no official catalog of rules for active logic; any a-sound rule can qualify, and a given active logic agent may be equipped with any number of these rules (see Section 9 for more on this). However, the fact that a-soundness is defined in terms active consequence, which is itself defined in terms of apperception functions, means that not every a-sound rule will be available for use in every situation. More specifically, whether or not there are direct contradictions in Σ = KB t , the apperception function may change which rules can and cannot be applied for that Σ. Next, consider a case where active modus ponens does apply, namely, let Γ = {S This concludes the presentation of the active logic semantics. In the next two sections (7 and 8) we will discuss some of the general properties of active logic that follow from its semantics, and compare active logic to other related work. After that, in Sections 9 and 10, we will discuss some of the practical issues involved with using active logic in real-world reasoning agents.
General Properties of Active Logic
One of the original motivations for active logic was the need to design formalisms for reasoning about an approaching deadline; for this use it is crucial that the reasoning take into account the ongoing passage of time as that reasoning proceeds. Thus, active logic reasons one step at a time, updating its belief about the current time at each step, using rules like the timing rule given in Definition 17.
This step-wise, time-aware approach gives active logic fine control over what it does, and does not, derive and inherit at each step; for instance, N ow(t) is not inherited at time step t + 1. To "inherit" P is, roughly speaking, to assert P at time t + 1 just in case it was believed at time t. However, in a temporal, non-monotonic formalism, what is justified now may not be justified later. For a simple example, consider that a certain observation at time t may justify the conclusion that it is raining at time t, and it may be reasonable to continue to believe this at time t + 1 (i.e. to inherit the belief). However, at some point in time, t + n, neither the original observation, nor the inherited belief can be considered justification for the continued belief that it is raining. Thus, although inheriting is a reasonable default behavior, there will be conditions and limits. This is accomplished by special inheritance rules like Definition 21. Note in particular the conditions governing that rule, conditions that can be tailored for different agents and circumstances.
Such step-wise control over inference gives active logic the ability to explicitly track the individual steps of a deduction. Thus, for instance, an inference rule can refer to the results of all inferences up until now-i.e. thru time t-as it computes the subsequent results (for time t + 1). This allows an active logic to reason, for example, about its own (past) reasoning; and in particular about what it has not yet concluded. Moreover, this can be performed quickly, since it involves little more than a lookup of the current knowledge base (see, e.g. Definition 20).
5
This last point is worth further elaboration and emphasis, for it is central to the active logic approach to modeling the reasoning of real-world agents. The reason that determining what one does not know-otherwise known as negative introspection-is simple in active logic is a direct result of the practical acknowledgment that any real agent is limited to reasoning only with whatever formulas (wffs) it has been able to come up with so far, rather than with implicit but not yet performed inferences. Thus, determining if a given formula P is known is not a question of seeing if P is a consequence of one's current beliefs, but only a question of seeing if P is actually present in the KB. This approach is especially important to the issue of performing consistency checks before accepting new formulas into the KB. After all, before accepting P , one may well want to know whether P is consistent with one's current beliefs. In general, P is not consistent with the KB if ¬P can be derived from KB. However, it is not in general possible to know, for any given formula if that formula is derivable from current beliefs, without actually going through the required deductions to prove it. That could take a great deal of time-more time than a typical agent will have before deciding to accept P . Cutting this process down to a simple KB look-up of ¬P , then, is an important practical simplification. So, instead of looking for arbitrary contradictions to P, we are only looking for direct contradictions (i.e. ¬P ).
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But won't this practical simplification mean that active logic KBs are more likely to become inconsistent? That is certainly a possibility, and yet, insofar as (a) contradictions are an inevitable part of living in and reasoning about the real world, and (b) the consistency of complex KBs is practically impossible to determine or maintain, then it seems a better bet to focus less on maintaining consistency, and more on an ability to reason effectively in the presence of contradictions, taking action with respect to them only when they become revealed in the course of inference (which itself might be directed toward finding contradictions, to be sure). This is where the other central features of active logic-its step-wise control over inference, and the built-in ability to refer to individual steps of reasoningcome into play, making active logic a natural formalism for detecting and reasoning about contradictions and their causes. For as soon as a contradiction reveals itself-that is, as soon as P and ¬P are both present in the KB-it is possible to "capture" it, preventing further reasoning using the contradictory formulas as premises (and thereby preventing any explosion of wffs), while at the same time marking their presence, to allow further consideration of the cause of the contradiction. Current implementations of active logic incorporate a "conflict-recognition" inference rule like Definition 18 for this purpose.
Through the use of such rules, direct contradictions can be recognized as soon as they occur, and further reasoning can be initiated to repair the contradiction, or at least to adopt a strategy with respect to it, such as simply avoiding the use of either of the contradictory formulas for the time being. Unlike in truth maintenance systems [15, 16] where a separate process resolves contradictions using justification information, in active logic the contradiction detection and handling [33] occur in the same reasoning process. In fact, the Contra predicate is a meta-predicate: it is about the course of reasoning itself (and yet is also part of that same evolving history).
Thus, speaking somewhat more broadly, active logic is a paraconsistent logic that achieves its paraconsistency in virtue of possessing two simultaneously active (and interactive) modes of reasoning, which might be called circumspective and literal. In literal mode, the reasoning agent is simply working with, and deriving the consequences of, its current beliefs. In circumspective mode, the reasoning agent is reasoning about its beliefs, noting, for instance, that it has derived a contradiction, and deciding what to do about that. It is important to active logic that these are not separate, isolated modes, but interactive and part of the same overall reasoning process. Thus, for instance, the (circumspective) derivation of Contra is triggered by the (literal) derivation of P and ¬P , and reasoning with Contra happens alongside reasoning about other matters. Likewise, reasoning about a contradiction may eventually result in the reinstatement of one of the conclusions, P or ¬P , to be carried forward and reasoned with in literal mode. It is precisely this ongoing interaction between literal and circumspective modes, between reasoning and self-monitoring, that allows active logic to avoid the pitfalls of explosive logics, and makes it more appropriate to the needs of real-world agents.
Comparison with related work
Active logic is primarily related to two bodies of work-work on temporal logics, and work on paraconsistent logics. We will treat each of these subjects in turn.
Temporal logics
Temporal logics-logical formalisms explicitly allowing for the representation of temporal information-were introduced by Prior (under the name of Tense Logic) in a series of writings between 1957 and 1969 [46, 44, 45] . Pnueli established the relevance of tense logic for understanding the runtime behavior of programs [39] . Such temporal logics are modal, with operators for notions such as the future truth of a predicate. A first-order approach to reasoning about time was employed by Allen [1] , with expressions such as Holds(A,t) to mean A is true at time t; Allen and others made major strides in the use of such formalisms (so-called action logics) in AI. Part of the effect of these latter efforts was to connect temporal logic to belief logics, i.e., logics for representing information about an agent that plans and acts in a dynamic world. Thus action logics typically have temporal aspects, since the passage of time is of central importance to the planning and carrying out of actions; see for instance [22] .
Another central feature of most such logics is a treatment of the frame problem. Definition 21 (the inheritance rule) might be considered a kind of frame axiom. While it does not quite assert that φ remains true despite an action having occurred, it has a similar effect: it says that φ will remain believed unless there is a reason not to believe it, such as might happen if an action is known to have negated φ.
Various logics of action and belief have been extensively studied for as long as AI has existed [29, 32, 30, 28] . Typically, the formalism is designed to represent the formation of an agent's beliefs (including its beliefs about the results of actions) based on a starting set of information (initial beliefs, or axioms). However, since belief-formation in any real-world agent must occur as a process in time, it is natural to consider a logic in which not only is time represented (i.e., one is able to express things about time, as in a temporal logic) but also passage of time is represented as an evolving process in which the "present" time moves forward during belief formation. Thus the agent has a certain set of beliefs "now", and another set at a later "now". But if the logic is to be used by the agent, then its own evolving notion of what time it is must be factored into the formalism as well. This is where active logics come in: an agent/temporal logic with a twist: an evolving now and corresponding time-sensitive inference rules.
Active logic is not the only formalism to consider time in this way. For instance, SNePS [51] , especially as applied to the Embodied Cassie project [50] , incorporates an indexical, evolving-time variable NOW. Cassie, a naturallanguage-using autonomous robot, uses this variable to track the passage of time, allowing it to do such things as appropriately alter verb tenses when discussing present or past actions. Cassie's temporal awareness also plays a role in time-sensitive planning projects like maintaining its battery and remediating unexploded land mines (in simulation).
The motivations for including such an evolving "now" in Cassie are quite similar to the motivations for including one in active logic. Ismail and Shapiro write: "[E]mbodied cognitive agents should . . . act in and reason about a changing world, using reasoning in the service of acting and acting in the service of reasoning. Second, they should be able to communicate their beliefs, and report their past, ongoing, and future actions in natural language. This requires a representation of time . . ." [27] However, there are some significant differences in the nature of the "now" incorporated into each formalism, and how it can therefore be used.
Perhaps the biggest difference is that for the SNePS-based agent Cassie, NOW is a meta-logical variable, rather than a logical term fully integrated into the SNePS semantics. The variable NOW is implemented so that it does, indeed, change over time (and, in particular, changes whenever Cassie acts in any way, including by reasoning), but this change is the result of actions triggering an external time-variable update. In active logic, in contrast, reasoning itself implies the passage of time. Perhaps in part because of this difference, SNePS is a monotonic logic, whereas active logic is non-monotonic, leveraging the facts that beliefs are had at times, and beliefs can be had about beliefs, to easily represent such things as "I used to believe P , but now I believe ¬P " using the Bel operator. SNePS is also able to represent beliefs about beliefs, but there is no indication that this ability is leveraged by SNePS to guide belief updates. Rather, all Cassie's beliefs are about states holding over time, so that belief change is effected by allowing beliefs to expire, rather than by formally retracting them. This is a strategy similar to that employed by the situation calculus (which does not itself incorporate a changing Now term) [32] . Finally, although SNePS is a paraconsistent logic, it is so in virtue of the fact that contradictions imply nothing at all, whereas in active logic contradictions imply Contra, a meta-level operator that can trigger further reasoning.
Paraconsistent logics
As mentioned in the introduction, the term paraconsistent logic is applied to logics that are not explosive. Another way to look at this concept is to consider that classical logic is so averse to inconsistency that it cannot distinguish between local inconsistency, where for some formula A both A and ¬A hold, and global inconsistency, where for all formulas A both A and ¬A hold. So in a paraconsistent logic, local inconsistency does not imply global inconsistency. For various reasons, including philosophical issues, the intrinsic interest of investigating paraconsistency, and particularly the increasing number of applications involving inconsistencies, there has been growing interest in this field, including several books, numerous papers, and three World Congresses on Paraconsistency: [5] and [12] are the Proceedings of the first two (see also [13] for a historical survey.
As noted in the survey paper [24] , paraconsistency may be achieved in several different ways. Modifying the axioms or rules is one technique. Another method stays within the framework of classical logic by the use of maximal consistent subsets of formulas. Consider an inconsistent set of formulas Γ. There must always be some subsets of Γ that are consistent, (for example, ∅ is consistent) hence there must be maximal consistent subsets of Γ. In this method A is deduced from Γ if A is deduced classically from all maximal consistent subsets of Γ [49] . Some researchers use additional criteria to find preferred consistent subsets and work with those [8] .
Another technique [7] extends the set of classical truth values from {T rue, F alse} to a larger set. Usually, the set of truth values is given an algebraic structure, typically a lattice. Perhaps the best-known of these is the lattice F OU R = {T rue, F alse, Both, N either} where Both stands for an inconsistency. A fourth approach extends classical logic by the addition of modal or metalevel operators. Modal logic has an operator for a formula to be possible (true in some world) and necessary (true in all worlds) where worlds are selected in some way. Both a formula A and its negation ¬A may be possible because they are true in different worlds, but that does not mean that all formulas are possible.
Consider now how active logic fits into the classification given above. In active logic the rules of inference are limited, and are based on the passage of time. Also the language contains the meta-level operator Contra to indicate contradictory statements. Hence active logic combines two of the methods above to achieve paraconsistency.
Other related work
Several other interesting frameworks exist that encompass many logical systems in a uniform manner. We briefly discuss two such frameworks here.
A Labelled Deductive System (LDS) [20] is a logical reasoning system employing both formulas and annotations for those formulas, called labels. The labels can have various contents with effects on the deductions. For instance, if the label indicates that one formula is better supported by evidence than another, then deductions using the better supported formula may be preferred over those using the other, especially in cases of conflict. Such an LDS would implement a non-monotonic logic with preferences or prioritized defaults. A group of LDSs called restricted access logics [21] deal specifically with inconsistent information. We mention LDS here because there is some evidence that the simple version of active logic SL 7 , described in [17] , can likewise be implemented by or described as an LDS [3] . This is an interesting finding, and although it is not clear that the version of active logic descibed here can likewise be expressed as an LDS, this may well turn out to be the case. Even so, active logic would be a special case of LDS with some interesting and valuable properties, such as non-monotonicity, paraconsistency, and temporal sensitivity.
Another interesting general framework is called adaptive logics. The adaptive logics that handle inconsistencies are called inconsistency-adaptive logics [6] . Adaptive logics are characterized by a lower limit logic, a set of abnormalities, and an adaptive strategy. The purpose of adaptive logics is to characterize inference relations for which there is no positive test that for every Σ and ϕ will answer "yes" if Σ ϕ. Active logics are more well behaved and have such a positive test. In fact, as we will show in the next section, even the limiting use of |= a has such a test in our case where the logic is essentially propositional.
The ideal active logic agent
In the previous sections we presented a semantics for active logic. One may ask if this semantics could be used as a practical guide to building active logic agents. We believe that this can be done through a concept called the ideal active logic agent. This is an agent that can infer exactly the 1-step active consequences of any Σ. Consider how such an ideal active logic agent could be built.
Obtaining the 1-step active logic consequences in Sn La is fairly easy using Definition 14. It is just a matter of getting the appropriate N ow, Contra, and Bel statements. The difficult part is getting the 1-step active logic consequences in Sn Lw .
Since Σ is finite, as remarked in Section 4 only finitely many apperception functions are needed, say ap 1 , ap 2 , . . ., ap n . We may imagine one subagent A i per ap i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Observe that not all of these n apperception functions are necessarily in AP Σ because some of them may not yield a consistent set in L w . Hence each subagent first needs to check if ap i ∈ AP Σ . In our case, since the language is basically propositional, this can be done by truth tables in a finite amount of time.
Next, continuing only with those sub-agents that passed the first test, enumerate all sentences in Sn Lw : ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 . . . and have each A i check if ap z i (Σ) |= ϕ j for j = 1, 2, . . .. Again, each such check can be done by truth tables in a finite amount of time. Each A i should include the set of ϕ j s that pass this test. This way, the n agents will generate (up to equivalence of apperception functions) exactly those sentences of L w that are 1-step active consequences. We could even dispense with the equivalence above by using infinitely many subagents.
Although it thus appears possible to build an ideal active logic agent, it is pretty clearly not a practical way to obtain active logic consequences. (In fact, if the logic were truly first-order, the consistency and implication checks could not be done.) So we introduce another concept: the practical active logic agent. The practical active logic agent is an implementable inferencing (and observing) agent that will infer only 1-step active consequences of its KB, but not all of them. The practical research question, then, is how such practical active logic agents might be built-with what rules and what apperception functions-so that they are limited to inferring only 1-step active consequences of their beliefs, but do not thereby have severely limited inferential powers. We will discuss this in the next section.
Practical active logic agents
In an earlier attempt at defining a semantics for active logic [2] , we discussed a version of the apperception function quite similar to what we have laid out here, but with the key difference that after an inference had taken place (i.e., after each time step) all the superscripts were automatically returned to 0. Let's call this the "reset version" of the apperception function. The advantage of the reset version was that it was possible to imagine literally implementing it, such that the agent could choose a small, clearly consistent set of formulas on which to focus to do inference, and then apply an apperception function such that the symbols in this set of formulas retained the superscript 0, and all other symbols were given unique non-zero superscripts. This guaranteed the consistency of the KB in a practically implementable way, and allowed inferences similar to those described here.
However, while such an agent is practically implementable, and inferentially powerful, Johan Hovold showed that it would in fact be too powerful, capable of inferring things that are not active consequences of its KB [26] . In particular, he showed that a logic using such an apperception function would be explosive.
Consider the following (inconsistent) set of sentences at time t: {S }. Since this would be true for any arbitrary sentence S 3 , a logic using this version of the apperception function is indeed explosive, in that any arbitrary sentence is derivable (in two time steps) from an inconsistent set.
It was in response to this discovery by Hovold that we changed the apperception function used in defining the semantics of active logic to the version detailed in Definition 11. But a practical active logic agent could still use the reset version and avoid the charge of explosivity, just as long as it lacked the necessary rule for inferring S 1 → S 2 from ¬S 1 . Thus, we claim that an agent equipped with the reset version of the apperception function, along with a carefully chosen set of inference rules, could be a practical active logic agent: it would be possible to implement, and would never conclude anything that was not an active consequence of its KB (according to Definitions 14 and 15 of active consequence given above).
The simplest example of such an agent is one equipped with only the timing rule (Definition 17), the direct contradiction rule (Definition 18), the positive introspection rule (Definition 19), the inheritance rule (Definition 21), and active modus ponens (Definition 22). Clearly, such an agent will have somewhat limited inferential abilities, yet would be perfectly adequate to many practical situations. The obvious question about such practical active logic agents is: exactly which rules, in which combinations, allow for maximum inferential power, while still limiting the agent to inferring only active consequences (according to Definitions 14 and 15) of its KB? This question is something we leave to future work.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have outlined a semantics for a time-sensitive, contradictiontolerant logical reasoning formalism designed for on-board use by real-world agents. Central to the semantics is the notion of an apperception function, inspired by the idea that, until an agent notices that a set of beliefs is inconsistent, that set seems consistent-and that when an inconsistency is noticed, that fact can be explicitly registered by the agent, and further reasoning with the inconsistent beliefs can be curtailed.
To keep this initial presentation relatively simple, we made a number of assumptions that in future work we hope to discard. For example, we assumed that the world is stationary, and thus all facts about the world are timelessly true. It should be noted that there is no problem in principle with applying active logic to the case of reasoning about a changing world-after all, the facts that beliefs are held at times, that the KB changes over time, and that inference is itself a temporal phenomenon, are all already explicitly modeled by the formalism. To handle a changing world, we would also have to model the additional facts that beliefs can be held not just at times, but about facts-attimes, and even about the durations of facts-e.g. that it rained yesterday, or that it rained yesterday for 1 hour between noon and one. Such modification is straightforward, especially given that we already have defined the changing set of world-facts W t , by reference to which the truths of temporally relative beliefs would be determined.
But whereas these changes are easily handled, there are some tricky aspects to modeling proper reasoning with temporally relative beliefs in a changing world. For instance, although in active logic we do not inherit N ow(t) at time t + 1, we probably do want to inherit a belief like "It is raining at t" to time t + 1, for even at time t + 1 it remains true that it was raining at t. Further, it will generally be reasonable to conclude from "It is raining at t" that "It is raining at t + 1", for if it is raining now, it will probably still be raining at the next moment. But unlike the case of N ow(t), from which it will always be correct to conclude N ow(t + 1), it will not always be correct to conclude "It is raining at t + 1" from "It is raining at t". Moreover, for different facts, the likely duration of their continued truth will also differ. From the fact that it is raining now, I might reasonably conclude that it is still raining five minutes later; but it would not be reasonable to conclude, just on this basis, that it is still raining twenty-four hours later. In contrast, from the fact that a mountain is in such-a-such a place it will be reasonable to continue to infer its truth for a very long time indeed. To handle such issues we can avail ourselves of the extensive literature on default reasoning and non-monotonic temporal logics, e.g., [48, 4, 9, 10, 14, 19, 25, 40, 37, 38, 36] . Because of these and similar complications, we thought that the issue of reasoning about a changing world deserved special, separate treatment.
Future work will also consider the extension of L w to first-order logic; multiple agents, reasoning both about the world and about one another's beliefs; and extending the semantics to include other predicates.
